New Article Explores the Psychology of False Pleas of Guilty

In a new article authored by Prof. Lucian Dervan, Dr. Vanessa Edkins, and Prof. Thea Johnson, the authors explore the forces that lead to false pleas of guilty through examination of two cases of serial offenders who remained undetected for significant periods of time in part because others were initially coerced into false pleas of guilty in the cases. 

Access a free copy of the article here.

From the introduction:

The last decade has seen significant growth in academic research and literature related to the plea bargaining system. In particular, much research has explored the impact of plea bargaining on the accused, including the phenomena of false guilty pleas by the innocent and false testimony in return for bargains. Both false guilty pleas and false testimony often result from the coercive bargaining practices regularly found in the criminal system. Plea bargaining is coercive when it overbears the will of the defendant, to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United States. Because of the state’s power over a criminal defendant, some argue that every interaction between the two contains some element of coercion. Regardless of where one draws the line of coercion, at a minimum, when an innocent person condemns them self or other innocent people through the plea process, their will has been overborne by the coercive power of the state. This Article focuses on the link between coercive plea bargaining and both false guilty pleas and false testimony against others.

Here, we seek to bring these harms and their attendant victims to light. We compile and synthesize the expanding body of research that demonstrates the clear connection between coercive plea practices and false guilty pleas and false testimony. This descriptive Part of the Article identifies the types of practices that put defendants most at risk of falsely condemning themselves or others. As the title of this Article suggests, we also identify the defendants who falsely plead guilty or who are compelled to offer false testimony as part of bargains and those against whom such false testimony is elicited as victims of plea bargaining, although they are often not attended to in this way. Understanding this category of defendants as victims expands our conception of the harm of certain regular features of the plea system.

The use of coercive incentives to induce false pleas and false testimony prompts us to recognize the pressing need for reform in the bargained justice space. In particular, the plea bargaining system should be reformed, both to reduce the coercive incentives that lead to false guilty pleas and false testimony and to create more oversight to ensure that the system’s inherent discretion is not used improperly. To this end, the authors—all members of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section’s Task Force on Plea Bargaining—highlight the sections of the 2023 Task Force Report that most directly speak to the problem of coercive plea bargaining. We hope this Part of the Article will encourage legal stakeholders to prioritize reforming coercive plea bargaining and give them ideas for how to do it.

This Article is the first part of a broader project that intends to shed light on the many, sometimes hidden or ignored, victims of coercive plea bargaining. These victims have received less attention than the practice itself. While this Article focuses on the first layer of victims of coercive plea bargaining, namely defendants who falsely condemn themselves or other innocents, a later article will focus on a second layer of victims, including the original victim, whose rights remain unvindicated when a false guilty plea allows the true perpetrator to escape justice, and also any victims who later fall prey to the actual guilty party. This broader two-part project intends to expand our understanding of who counts as a victim in the criminal justice system and the role of coercive bargaining in perpetrating these wrongs.

In Part I, this Article explores the reasons that defendants falsely plead guilty. It provides an overview of the emerging body of literature on false guilty pleas, focusing on the factors that increase the risk of false guilty pleas. In Part II, this Article demonstrates how coercive plea bargaining encourages defendants to give false testimony against others. We also explore how these twin harms—false pleas and false testimony—should be seen as creating a category of victims of plea bargaining, namely defendants who are compelled to falsely condemn themselves and others. Finally, in Part III, this Article turns to a set of on-the-ground reforms that can reduce coercive bargains and their many victims.